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Harmonizing the Policy of the Bankruptcy code and Article 9 
Edwin E. Smith Elizabeth Warren James J. White 
In a true sens e bankr uptcy l aw--at least as represent ed by 
the 1978 Code--is in conflic t , not in harmony , with Article 9. To 
a considerable degree (perhaps more than they r eal i ze) debtors 
and unsecured c redi tors got things they wanted from congr ess by 
the adoption of t he Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. It is doubtful 
that that Act c ou ld have been passed i n any Congr ess before or 
since . In many ways, the rights of t he debtor and of the 
unsecured c reditors have been cut back since the adoption of the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act . 
Consider the points of dispute discussed below and some of 
t he things that might be done about them . 
1 . Virtually all of the lit i gati on on the question whether 
a security i nterest has been perfected a r ises in the ba nkruptcy 
court . The r e one sees bankruptcy judges dealing wi th the question 
whether name changes, the omission of a name, or some other 
defect in the place of filing or in the document that was filed 
renders a secured creditor unperfected. Most of that lit igation 
would go away if 9-301{1) (b) wer e repealed . That secti on reads 
as follows: 
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) , an 
unperfected security interest is subordinate to the r i ghts 
of • - • • (b) a person who becomes a l ien creditor be f ore the 
securit y interest is perfected( . ] 
I f s ection 9-301(1) (b) were repealed, an unperfected securit y 
int e rest would defeat a lien creditor under state law. Since the 
trustee in bankruptcy has the r i ghts of a lien creditor--and 
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normally no greater rights--against a personal property secured 
creditor, the trustee's claims under 544(a) would be subordinated 
to the unperfected secured creditor's claim and he would lose to 
the secured creditor even in circumstances where the secured 
creditor had failed to file a financing statement. 
Why have not the secured creditors proposed the abolition of 
9-301(1) (b) or, a smaller step, the addition of a term to Article 
9 to the effect that any good faith attempt at filing renders the 
secured creditor perfected at least against a lien creditor? One 
might argue for this outcome in bankruptcy on the theory that the 
trustee represents basically unsecured creditors, most of whom 
will never have been injured by or relied upon an absence of 
filing by a secured creditor. See, James J. White, "Revising 
Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litigation," 26 Loy. L.A.L.Rev. 823 
(1993). 
2. A second grand area of conflict between ban~ruptcy and 
Article 9 arises in attacks on secured lenders who finance LBOs. 
In a number of cases the creditors' argument that they give 
reasonable equivalent value by lending money has fallen on deaf 
ears. Collapsing these transactions, courts have been willing to 
say the secured creditor's loan goes into the hands and pockets 
of the shareholders of the target company (even though the money 
is not lent directly to them) whereas the value comes out of the 
pocket of the target company itself. Thus the value is given to 
one and the transfer comes from another. This outcome, of 
course, makes the secured creditors into the policemen of the LBO 
trade. But where do the courts get the power to disregard the 
form of the transactions? Should t he Bankruptcy Code or , more 
likely the state fraudulent conveyance law, be modified to 
r e cognize that the secured creditor gives new val ue a nd is not 
t herefore subject t o upset by a fraudulent conveyance argument? 
3. The most pervas i ve point of tension between secured 
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. creditors on the one hand and bankruptcy on the other arises from 
the stay, from the terms of section 1129 and from other sections 
in Chapter 11 that allow the debtor in possession to disregard 
the supposed superiority and full protection that the Bankruptcy 
Code gives to the secured creditor. 
What could and should be done with the Code here? Would a 
shortening of the exclusivity period be sensible? What about the 
possibil i ty of the Code's adopting the losing proposition in 
Timbers, namely, that adequate protection always includes the 
requirement of paying current lost opportunity costs to a secured 
creditor who will not receive its collateral at once? Are the 
secured creditors going to argue for such changes before the 
Commission and the Congress? What other suggestions should they 
go for? 
